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Abstract  
This article uses the World Bank's engagement with religious actors to analyse their 
differentiated role in setting the development agenda raising three key issues. First, 
engagements between international financial institutions (IFIs) and religious actors are 
formalised thus excluding many of the actors embedded within communities in the South. 
Secondly, the varied politics of religious actors in development are rarely articulated 
and a single position is often presented. Thirdly, the potential for development 
alternatives from religious actors excluded from these engagements is overlooked, due 
in part to misrecognition of the mutually constitutive relationship between secular and 
sacral elements in local contexts. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Over the last two decades there has been a shift in the way the development agenda is 
negotiated and set characterised by the opening of the ‘development space’ to a broader 
range of actors, particularly civil society. Critical approaches to this opening have 
identified the asymmetries of power between different civil society actors in the one 
hand, and between civil society actors and international financial institutions (IFIs) on 
the other. This has resulted in the inclusion of civil society actors that adopt existing 
development orthodoxy in the development space and the exclusion of those that 
challenge this orthodoxy. Within this literature there is an emerging emphasis on the 
agency of those actors excluded, and reconstructive critical approaches have highlighted 
the potential for alternative development ideas and practices from these actors, 
particularly within the South. However this analysis is rarely extended to religious actors 
despite growing recognition of the role played by religious actors in development at the 
local and national levels in the South and at the international level (Clarke and Jennings, 
2008; Haynes, 2007). This article seeks to open a critical research agenda on the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of religious actors in the development space at the 
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international and local levels.1 We argue that analysis of the dynamics of inclusion and 
exclusion of civil society actors in the development space needs to be extended to 
religious actors and that the potential of these actors for providing development 
alternatives and counter-hegemonic agency needs to be given more consideration. We 
are particularly concerned with relations between civil society actors and IFIs, as it is 
these relations that best exemplify the opening of the development space and the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. We have chosen the World Bank as a site for 
analysis because in recent years it has broadened its development approach to include 
civil society actors and has created an explicit space for engaging with religious actors in 
development.   
In examining these dynamics we make a three-fold argument. First, in both the 
literature on religious actors in development and the engagement between IFIs and 
religious actors the focus is on formalised religious actors, often referred to as faith-
based organisations or FBOs, and as a result informal actors are often overlooked in 
negotiating, setting and contesting the development agenda.2 Secondly, the varied 
politics of religious actors are rarely articulated. Unlike secular civil society actors, 
religious actors tend to be viewed homogenously and separately from other civil society 
actors and from the communities in which they are embedded. We contend that religious 
actors are deeply involved in both top-down development and in contesting 
development; thus a singular form of agency cannot be generalised to all religious actors 
involved in development. Thirdly, underpinning both of these limitations is a lack of 
consideration for the mutually constitutive relationship between secular and sacral3 
elements at the local level and increasingly at the international level. This relationship 
                                                 
1
 We use the term ‘local’ to refer to political and social spaces existing at the sub-national level within 
nation-states as defined by the peoples that constitute said spaces. Such a space can be limited in size and 
scale, such as a particular community centred on a village or number of villages or an urban locality. Local 
can also refer to a political and social space extending across provinces, federal states, autonomous regions 
or other sub-national units. Local can also refer to a non-territorial political and social space within which 
development, civil society actors, and religious actors are embedded such as among particular ethnic 
groups, indigenous communities, and class and caste groups. Local in not used as a substitute for 
‘national’, especially when being analysed in comparison to ‘international’.   
2
 We use the term ‘religious actors’ rather than faith-based organisations when recognising both formal 
and informal actors associated with religious organisations and communities  
3
 We adopt Haynes’ three-fold definition of religion as ‘to do with: the idea of transcendence, that is, it 
relates to supernatural realities; with sacredness, that is, as a system of language and practice that 
organizes the world in terms of what is deemed holy; and with ultimacy, that is, it relates people to the 
ultimate conditions of existence.’ (2006, p.223) These attributes constitute what we have called ‘sacral’ 
elements that exist in the spaces of development.  
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shapes the way the development agenda is negotiated, set, and contested in different 
locations and must be considered in research on the role of religion in development and 
in the practice of development in the field, particularly in the context of ongoing 
engagement between religious actors and IFIs and between secular and religious civil 
society actors.  
At the outset it is important to make two disclaimers. First, we are not advocating 
that religion holds the solution to deficiencies in the development agenda at the 
international, national, or local levels. Nor are we suggesting that religious actors, by 
definition, are more capable of providing development alternatives. We adopt an open 
critical perspective on religion in development, analysing the different forms it takes and 
the different contributions it makes to development whether positive, negative, and/or 
ambiguous. Secondly, we are not suggesting that religion be simply grafted onto existing 
ways of understanding or practicing development. We do not wish to ‘add’ religion to 
what is already known about development, rather we are analysing religion because it is 
a primary element in most of the locations where development interventions take place. 
Religion exists in the lives of those subject to the policies derived from development 
agendas and in the lives of those formulating such policies. Yet critical discussions of 
the role of religious actors in development have often overlooked many of the ways that 
religious actors contribute to improving people’s lives.  
This article begins by discussing the opening of the development space to civil 
society, including religious actors. While the opening of the development space has 
altered the relationship between states, international development agencies, and civil 
society, the focus of this article is restricted to the enhanced role for civil society actors 
in their dealings with IFIs. The second section uses existing literature to analyse the 
critical reading of this opening and presents a typology of civil society actors included 
in, and excluded from, the development space. The third section applies this critical 
reading to religious actors using the example of the World Bank and its engagement with 
religious actors. The fourth section builds upon the case study to infer upon the way IFIs 
such as the World Bank favour formalised organisations and exclude other religious 
actors. The final section assesses the shortcomings of the dominant critical approach in 
identifying these dynamics and suggests further directions in research before the article 
concludes.  
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2 OPENING THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA  
The development agenda refers here to the issues defined as ‘problems’ and the 
solutions proposed to alleviate or at least reduce the impacts of these problems. Setting 
the development agenda involves gathering knowledge about conditions in the South, 
which of these conditions require intervention, which agencies will intervene, who will 
be partners in these interventions, and the policies to guide these interventions. Since the 
early 1990s the actors involved in negotiating and setting the development agenda and 
implementing development projects have broadened significantly. The political space for 
negotiating and setting the development agenda, termed the ‘development space’ here, 
has been opened to a range of actors from academics to professional practitioners, 
planners to think-tanks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to representatives from 
transnational corporations. This enables these actors to participate in the process of 
defining development priorities, formulating suitable polices, and implementing these 
policies.   
Given the opening of the development space, the question of ‘who sets the 
development agenda?’ has become crucial for critical scholars. It has been argued that 
knowledge underpins the setting of the development agenda and is concentrated in IFIs, 
particularly the World Bank and regional development banks, as well as influential 
bilateral aid donors. Since the shift away from state-led development towards market-led 
development in the 1970s the power of IFIs has increased as they control both 
knowledge to set development priorities and material capacity to implement them (Bøås 
and McNeill, 2004, pp. 3-6). The development agenda espoused by IFIs came under 
heavy criticism throughout the 1980s and 1990s and the response of IFIs has been 
refereed to as a ‘new kind of synthesis’ that moves away from strict neoliberal doctrine 
and reconsiders the role of the state, the need for good governance, and the impacts of 
market-led adjustments on furthering poverty (Öniş and Şenses, 2005, p. 273). This has 
been a complex process involving multiple actors and the set of ideas emerging from 
this process remain heavily contested. However, one clear and significant outcome of 
this process is that IFIs have opened a space for other actors to negotiate and set the 
development agenda (Guttal, 2006, p. 27). More than any other actors, the opening of 
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the development space has led to a greater role for civil society in setting, negotiating, 
and implementing development priorities (Carbone and Lister, 2006, p. 7).  
While definitions of civil society vary most theorists refer to a ‘sphere’ of 
political and social activity that is separate from the state and the market and to the 
actors that operate within this sphere (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 18; Kaldor, 2003; 
Scholte, 2002). Used in this way civil society encompasses a range of actors, including 
social movements, community organisations, political parties, trade unions, though the 
term is increasingly being used to refer simply to NGOs, particularly in discussions of 
development (Amoore and Langley, 2004, p. 91). At the international, national, and 
local levels IFIs and bilateral aid donors are viewing civil society as a means of 
legitimising development programs by engaging civil society actors as partners 
(Edwards, 1999; Harrison, 2007; Henry et al, 2004; Hudson, 2001). This has been 
particularly evident since the World Bank introduced ‘good governance’ and fostering 
of ‘social capital’ as a major part of its funding conditions (Harriss, 2001/2004; 
McNeill, 2004) and since the adoption of a policy discourse that advocates 
‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ by IFIs and bilateral donors (Cornwall and Brock, 
2006). Additionally, recent scholarship has focussed on the inclusion of religious actors 
within civil society their increasing visibility in development (Benedetti, 2006; Clarke, 
2006). 
 
3 ‘NEW SYNTHESIS’ OR TOP-DOWN HEGEMONY? 
Far from seeing this as the beginning of a more inclusive and participatory development 
agenda, critical scholarship has drawn attention to the complicity of civil society actors 
in reproducing the top-down development agenda. The aim of critical theory is to 
examine the existing order and question how that order has been formed, and then focus 
on the ways that the order may be transformed (Cox, 1981/1996, pp. 89-90). Cox made 
the distinction between problem solving theory and critical theory. Unlike problem 
solving theory which seeks to explain events using existing structures and actors, a 
critical approach does not take institutions or social and power relations as natural or 
given, rather critical theory seeks to explore their origins and assess whether they are in 
the process of changing (1981/1996, pp. 97-9). Critical approaches explore the potential 
for alternatives and encourage struggles to achieve such ends (Linklater, 1992, p. 79). 
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Critical approaches to development seek to deconstruct and examine the material and 
ideational power relations that underpin development orthodoxy, yet they also seek to 
reconstruct alternatives to that orthodoxy (Matthews, 2004, p. 373), and thus questions 
of inclusion and exclusion form an important element of critical approaches.  
 Critical analysts of the opening of the development space have concluded that 
far from signifying any substantial change in development thinking or practice, the ‘new 
synthesis’ demonstrates the hegemony of the international development establishment, 
particularly IFIs (Guttal, 2006; Girvan, 2006; Ocampo, 2002; Taylor, 2004). According 
to this perspective the opening of the development space to civil society provides 
limited opportunities and effectively coopts oppositional actors, particularly through 
working and funding partnerships between civil society actors and operational agencies. 
In short, IFIs and other donors fund civil society actors that will not challenge the 
programs being implemented, will not destabilise local society, and will legitimise the 
programs by agreeing to be local partners in a subordinate position (Huddock, 1999; 
Lewis, 2001). Thus it has been argued that the relationship between civil society and 
IFIs and other donors has shifted from an oppositional to a co-operative dynamic 
(Utting, 2006). This leaves actors attempting to challenge or change the development 
agenda marginalised in favour of actors supportive of the status quo. 
Chandhoke argues that civil society actors favoured in development are well-
established NGOs headed by experts and professionals from the North, or citizens of the 
South trained in the North, and although some of these NGOs may form partnerships 
with smaller community-based actors these relations are characterised by ‘infinite 
dependence’ (2003, p. 76). This leads her to question ‘whose political agendas do these 
NGOs advance when they intervene in crucial areas of collective life?’ (2003, p. 72) A 
range of empirical studies support Chandhoke’s argument; including studies from Latin 
America (Grugel, 2000), Senegal, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Michael, 2004), Sri Lanka 
(Goonatilake, 2006), Bangladesh (Feldman, 2003), and East Timor (Brunnstrom, 2003). 
Furthermore it has been demonstrated that in certain locations where formalised NGOs 
did not already exist they have been created by governments in order to access 
international funding and fulfil IFI conditions (Obadare, 2005; Vasavakul, 2003).  
Therefore while access to the development space may have increased for civil 
society the space is dominated by professional, formal, and compliant actors. Civil 
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society actors granted access to the development space must curb any radical or 
transformative inclinations to continue to receive access and funding. Restrictions are 
even more pronounced for civil society actors in the South as they compete with each 
other for grants and partnerships with Northern NGOs, IFIs, and bilateral donors. This 
does not necessarily mean that civil society actors granted access to the development 
space have had no influence or are less legitimate representatives than those excluded. 
Indeed, the opening of the development space is an improvement on decades of 
exclusion for virtually all civil society actors. However, the asymmetries of power 
apparent in the opening of the development space can curtail and control the level of 
influence of those granted access and limit the types of actors granted access in the first 
instance. In this process a potentially vast source of alternative ideas and practices is 
also lost.   
In addressing the question of ‘which civil society actors are granted access to the 
development space?’ three broad types of civil society actors emerge from the critical 
literature. The first are formalised civil society organisations based in the North that 
have access to institutions where the development agenda is set and negotiated, 
particularly IFIs and United Nations agencies. They implement development priorities 
in the South, often in partnerships with local organisations, and their professional 
development expertise gives them disproportionate power over their Southern partners. 
The need to implement programs funded by IFIs and other international donors limits 
their transformative potential making them likely to reproduce the development agenda 
(Murphy, 2005). The second are formalised civil society organisations from the South 
that work in partnership with Northern organisations, IFIs, and often their own national 
governments. In order to be chosen to work in partnerships these organisations must 
relinquish their autonomy and ensure that their approach to development reflects that of 
their financiers and Northern partners. Despite being staffed by and often headed by 
nationals from the country in question, professional requirements mean that the staff are 
generally drawn from the social and political elite, limiting their understating of 
development needs of people from other class and ethnic groups, and ensuring they have 
an embedded interest in maintaining the broader status quo (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; 
Mohan, 2002, p. 133; Townsend et al, 2002; Ulvila and Hossain, 2002). The third are 
local civil society actors that are more deeply involved in communities at the grassroots. 
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The types of civil society actors funded through IFIs and operational agencies are 
generally those more able to present themselves as more professionalised which 
potentially marginalises smaller and less professionalised actors. Some of these actors 
may have a deeper understanding of local development needs, though this is not 
necessarily a given. As distinct from the second type of actors above, they have limited 
access to the development space and to funds and partnerships whether international or 
national (Amoore and Langley, 2004, p. 99). This third type of actor includes formalised 
NGOs and philanthropic groups, but also more informal social movements, community 
groups, networks of activists, and collectives. In much of the literature these actors are 
perceived as having a better understanding of development needs, have more sustainable 
solutions to development problems, and are able to utilise knowledge that is otherwise 
marginalised by Northern expertise. Though still relatively powerless against the top-
down, professionalised, development establishment (White, 1996) they are perceived to 
provide the best hope for alternative development approaches. It should be noted that 
this perception has also been accused of reifying and romanticising the grassroots, 
glossing over inequalities and homogenising communities (Agrawal and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2001, p. 12).  
While both the critical approach to the opening of the development space and the 
differentiation between types of civil society actors are welcome, the critical approach 
stops short of fully engaging with religious actors. While there has been a surge of 
literature on the role of religion in development over the last decade, critical scholars 
have contributed little to these discussions. We begin to address this shortcoming by 
examining the role of religious actors in negotiating, setting, and most crucially 
contesting the development agenda.  
 
4 FAITH AND ETHICS AGENDA AT THE WORLD BANK   
As the study of world politics grapples with the question of secularism and its 
alternatives (Berger, 1999; Casanova, 1994; Esposito and Watson, 2000; Fox and 
Sandler, 2006; Hurd, 2008; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Thomas, 2005) there is an 
increasing awareness that religious actors are prominent in vast numbers of communities 
in the South. As a World Bank working paper recently acknowledged, ‘religion is a 
central part of the international system…even if it wished to do so, the Bank could not 
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entirely sidestep the faith engagement’ (World Bank, 2006, p.3). An emerging body of 
literature is concerned with the relationships between religion and development (Clarke 
and Jennings, 2008; Eade, 2002; Harcourt, 2003; Marshall and Keough, 2005; Marshall 
and Van Saanen, 2007; Thomas 2004). This section considers the role of religious actors 
in the opening of the development space. The question ‘who sets the development 
agenda?’ needs to be extended via two additional questions: ‘what role do religious 
actors play in setting the development agenda?’ and ‘which religious actors are included 
and which are excluded?’  
As noted above, IFIs such as the World Bank play a central role in setting the 
international development agenda. A critical reading of the faiths and development 
program of the World Bank provides an insight into the place of religion in this process. 
There are least three external and three internal factors that helped reposition the World 
Bank on the question of religion. These elements emerged in the same context as the 
opening of the development space in the 1980s and 1990s. First, highly effective NGO 
advocacy against World Bank environmental policy in the mid-1980s included religious 
advocacy groups which instigated the direct engagement with religious actors (Pallas, 
2005, p. 678). In addition, a coalition of advocacy groups on environmental issues called 
the Alliance for Religion and Conservation (ARC) emerged in the mid-1980s and was 
formalised as an NGO in 1995 (Palmer and Finlay, 2003, p. xv). In 1997 the ARC 
network facilitated the first high-level linkages between the World Bank and religious 
leaders (ARC, 2008). Secondly, religious advocacy on debt in the South via the Jubilee 
2000 campaign influenced the policy priorities of in-coming World Bank President 
James Wolfensohn on the issue of highly indebted countries (Marshall and Keough, 
2004, p. 44; Valley, 1990). Faith-based advocacy on debt relief and human rights 
subsequently became mainstreamed in influential policy networks, notably in the UK 
and the US, and has continued to be a prominent part of the international development 
agenda (Busby, 2007; Clarke, 2007). Thirdly, policy developments on religion in other 
international organisations such as the United Nations, Inter-American Development 
Bank, World Health Organisation and the International Labour Organisation influenced 
the World Bank’s approach (Peccoud, 2004; Thomas, 2005, pp. 225-226; World Bank, 
2006, p. 6). The Bank has documented a raft of other linkages between religious actors 
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and development institutions (Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007; Marshall and Keough, 
2005; Marshall and Keough, 2004; Marshall and Marsh, 2003; Belshaw et al., 2001). 
 There are also three internal processes important for understanding the increasing 
interest in religion within the World Bank. First, an informal staff forum called the 
Friday Morning Group explicitly linked religion to a ‘values’ discussion at the Bank, and 
contributed to the institution’s move beyond a structural adjustment ethos (Beckmann et 
al., 1991). David Beckmann, who helped found the group in 1981, warned the institution 
in 1983 that ‘the Bank’s activities have become markedly less focused on reducing 
poverty’ (Kapur et al., 1997, p. 349; Thomas, 2005, pp. 225-226). Secondly, World 
Bank President Wolfensohn (1995-2005) was personally determined to bring religion 
into the Bank’s operations (Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007, pp. 5-8) despite the 
Executive Board voting in 2001 to reject Wolfensohn’s proposal to establish a small 
‘Directorate on Faith’ by 24 votes to zero (Wolfensohn, 2004, pp. 21-22; Tyndale, 2003, 
p. 25; see also Clarke, 2007).4 The program survived as a specialised unit within the 
External Affairs Vice-Presidency to be funded by the discretionary President’s 
Contingency Fund and the Development Dialogue for Values and Ethics was established 
to operationalise World Bank partnerships with religious actors (World Bank, 2006). 
Thirdly, the survey Voices of the Poor, commissioned to inform the World Development 
Report 2000-2001, revealed that among the sixty thousand poor women and men 
surveyed, ‘churches and mosques, as well as sacred trees, rivers, and mountains’ were 
highly valued among the poor who were also aware of the detrimental effects of actions 
by religious actors on the development of their communities (Narayan, 2001, pp. 45-46). 
The priority to engage ‘religion’ was thus embedded within the Bank’s own knowledge 
expertise.   
The external and internal factors above describe ways in which religion entered 
the policy discourse, networks and institutional framework of perhaps the most 
influential actor involved in setting the international development agenda. Added to 
these are broader imperatives demanded by the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New 
                                                 
4
 Various explanations of this vote have been offered. Wolfensohn situates the problem with state 
stakeholders at the WB: ‘national governments do not give homes to faith-based organisations typically in 
their own administrative set-ups, and they’re just not prepared to let us do it.’ (Wolfensohn, 2004, pp. 21-
22); Tyndale (2003, p. 25) posits a ‘link between religious groups and political conflicts in many parts of 
world’; Clarke (2007) suggests ‘concern about the erosion of church-state boundaries in the USA and its 
potential spill-over into US policy on international development’.  
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York and Washington. The World Bank example demonstrates the ways that religious 
actors are included in the process of negotiating and setting the development agenda. 
The following section frames this process of inclusion against some important 
exclusionary dynamics.  
 
5 EXCLUDING RELIGION FROM ABOVE  
As previously discussed, critical approaches to the role of civil society in development 
discuss three broad types of civil society actors as a way of identifying asymmetrical 
relations of power. When applied to religious actors involved in development this 
approach reveals important differences in the status of religious actors and the potential 
for exclusion from the development space of particular types of religious actors. We 
illustrate this by classifying religious actors associated with the World Bank using the 
typology of civil society actors constructed above. Groups have been selected because 
they meet one of three criteria: they have entered into formal partnerships with the 
World Bank, have been involved in specific dialogues with the World Bank on 
development issues, or have been identified as prospective development partners by the 
World Bank. The differentiation of these actors according to the critical development 
typology is demonstrated in Table 1. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 is not designed to critique the relative contributions of listed organisations, but 
to indicate the relative position and type of religious actors in relation to the World 
Bank. This highlights three characteristics of the World Bank’s faith and development 
agenda. The first is a priority toward formalised organisations. This is to be expected 
given that the institutional requirements of the World Bank favour partnerships of formal 
activities and reporting and that the requirements binding the World Bank’s ideology for 
faith and development partnerships lies in a benchmarking activity measured by the 
Millennium Development Goals (Marshall and Marsh, 2003). The second is that 
engagements with religious actors categorised above as informal are more problematic 
for the Bank. For example, the Guatemalan Inter-religious Dialogue on Development 
(DIRGD) revealed a ‘glaring lack of documentation, understanding and use of the rich 
store of knowledge, work and ideas of faith institutions in development realms’ 
(Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 88). The Ethiopian Interfaith Forum for Development 
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Dialogue and Action (EIFDDA) was, in turn, hindered by an inability to engage 
constructively with the economic framework of the World Bank’s poverty reduction 
strategy and its lack of formalised membership resulted in a lack of ‘clear strategic 
direction’ (Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 92). Thirdly, the mechanism used to include 
informal faith-based programs in the World Bank program was the World Faiths 
Development Dialogue (WFDD). Though described as an ‘independent NGO’ the 
WFDD was from its inception dependent upon directives from the Development 
Dialogue team at the World Bank. Despite its commitment to deep engagements with 
religious communities, the WFDD experienced difficulties ‘especially over how WFDD 
is perceived by faith communities critical of the World Bank, IMF…and G7/8’ (Taylor 
et al., 2003, p. 2). In 2005 it was placed ‘in hibernation awaiting decisions by its trustees 
and partners (notably the World Bank)’ (World Bank, 2006, p. 1, fn.1). Yet significantly, 
from its own inception the Development Dialogue was virtually ignored at the executive 
levels of the World Bank (World Bank, 2006, pp. 1,4) and its eventual inclusion in the 
Human Development Anchor is described as philosophically and instrumentally 
unsuccessful (World Bank, 2006, p. 4).  
 From this brief example we identify three factors that demonstrate the value of a 
critical reading of religion in the development space. The first is that formalised 
religious organisations seem to have a different capacity than informal religious groups 
and communities in relations with IFIs as they have access to the political spaces where 
the international development agenda is negotiated and set. This is not to suggest that 
such groups cannot challenge the development agenda. The peace-making record of the 
Community of Sant’Egidio and the advocacy potential of the newly formed WFDA are 
both examples of this. Yet of equal significance are the limitations that formality places 
on contesting dominant ideas and practices. This is particularly important for analysing 
religious actors in development because religio-cultural dynamics are more deeply 
rooted in communities than organisations (Thomas, 2004), suggesting a divergence 
between the types of actors included in the development space and the types of actors 
embedded in communities, especially in the South. Thus, from a World Bank 
perspective the informal engagements described in Table 1 are attributed with a lesser 
status as ‘guideposts’ when compared to partnerships with formal organisations which 
are considered as models (Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 87). This may be due to the 
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embryonic nature of initiatives, but also because they constitute attempts by informal 
networks of religious actors embedded in communities to engage in grassroots 
transformative partnerships (see Tyndale, 2006).  
 Secondly, formal institutional organs designed to enrich faith and development 
partnerships at the grass-roots level within and outside the World Bank are themselves 
marginalised from centralised development processes. For instance the WFDD and the 
Development Dialogue on Ethics and Values have both struggled for legitimacy and 
funding. If central bodies such as these are ineffective, it is more than reasonable to 
suggest a large number of informal religious actors operating at the local level in the 
South remain completely excluded from the so-called rise of religion in development at 
the international level. In this sense the World Bank is an arena of contestation where 
religious development priorities can be coopted and marginalised.  
 Thirdly the dynamics of including and excluding religious actors homogenises 
religion and coopts it into the knowledge base of IFIs, further limiting the potential for 
development alternatives from religious actors. Clarke has usefully categorised FBOs 
into five types: apex bodies, charitable/development organisations, socio-political 
organisations, missionary organisations, and illegal or terrorist organisations (2008: 24-
32). Combining Clarke’s categories and our critical development typology, World Bank 
engagements with FBOs described above seem to homogenise religion around apex 
bodies and development organisations over socio-political organisations whose activities 
might fall outside the priorities of the development agenda. Yet it is also noteworthy that 
Clarke’s FBO typology is based on degrees of formality, and informal development 
activities grounded in religious communities remain excluded from the analysis. The 
inclusion of religious actors in the development space requires an accommodation of 
both socio-political advocacy groups and informal associations and networks.  
 These factors illustrate the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion toward religious 
civil society actors by IFIs and within international development more broadly. The 
exclusion of informal religious actors embedded in communities in the South, in turn, 
excludes many of the possibilities of transformative change and development 
alternatives. Thus only a limited number of voices emerge from the religious ‘sector’ in 
development. A critical reading of religious actors differentiates between the types of 
actors included in the development space and those that are excluded and examines the 
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limitations on their ability to negotiate and set the development agenda. We also begin to 
see the asymmetries of power between IFIs and religious actors, between different types 
of religious actors, and even within IFIs. Yet it is here that the critical approach to 
religious actors in development tends to stop short. For critical research aimed at altering 
asymmetrical relations of power within the development agenda, the challenge exists to 
broaden analysis of civil society actors to include organisational and community-based 
dynamics of religion within its own critique. Beyond the boundaries of the development 
agenda, the possibility of religion as a deep resource for contesting development 
orthodoxy and providing alternatives is poorly conceptualised and often ignored.  
 
6 EXCLUDING RELIGION FROM BELOW  
Whilst the critical view highlights the exclusion of informal religious actors from above, 
critical approaches operate with a limited view of religion from below. This undermines 
critiques of inclusion and exclusion of religious actors in the development space.5 This 
excludes two important dynamics of religion in development. First, critical approaches 
overlook the role of religion in the material contestations of development. The 
importance of materialist concerns in the critical tradition is matched by a suspicion of 
the transcendent ideologies of religion that are seen to undermine the immanent and 
situated needs of the poor. We challenge oppositional binaries between material/secular 
and spiritual/religious concerns, and argue that it is misleading to conclude that the 
materialist ontology of the critical traditional is incompatible with religious agency (Fox 
and Sandler, 2006, p. 170).  
A prime example of critical development ideology and practice by religious 
actors is the liberation theology movements that flourished in Central and South 
America between the 1960s and 1990s. Not unlike critical approaches more generally, 
liberation theologies have passed through forms of ‘leftist fundamentalism’ toward ‘a 
more complex reading’ of power and development (Miguez, 2006, p. 125). Liberation 
theology is rooted in a praxis-based epistemology (Bennett, 2007). It is grounded in 
theological and political advocacy for the poor (Boff and Boff, 1987, pp. 1-10; Bonino, 
1975) and in Freire’s ideology of conscientization (Berryman, 1987, pp. 34-38). It also 
incorporates both materialist and indigenous re-readings of religious tradition (Belo, 
                                                 
5
 Additionally this limitation could be extended to critical considerations of exclusion from below in civil 
society more generally, though this is beyond the scope of this article.  
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1981; Brown, 1984; Miguez, 2006, pp. 122-125; Miranda, 1974). Liberation theologies 
construct frameworks for action where immanent (liberationist) and transcendent 
(salvationist) ideals are employed to advocate for those who are ‘are totally outside the 
system’ and who suffer the ‘idolatry of the market’, ‘exclusion’ and commodification 
(Miguez, 2006, p. 129).  
In his seminal work, A Theology of Liberation, Gutierrez set the cause of 
liberation for ‘oppressed peoples and social classes’ by critiquing developmentalist 
(desarrollista) orthodoxy and infusing religious elements into alternative development 
conceptions (1973, pp. 21-42). For Gutierrez, it was within a ‘radical perspective of 
liberation’ – grounded in the situated faiths and communities of the poor – that 
development ‘finds its true meaning and possibilities of accomplishing something 
worthwhile’ (1973, p. 36). Such peoples are overwhelmingly religious in outlook, and 
this impacts directly on how development is perceived. In the contemporary context 
similar movements have been identified in Korea (Suh, 1991), Malawi (Mitchell, 2002), 
Senegal (Galvan, 2004), Cambodia (Poethig, 2002) and Thailand (Darlington, 1998) to 
name a small sample. They represent important expressions of a critical re-reading of 
culture by religious actors and a core dimension of the ‘global struggle for authenticity’ 
in development emanating from the South (Thomas, 2000, p.818; Haynes, 1994, pp. 18-
43).  
The second issue excluded by critical approaches is the potential for counter-
hegemonic agency by religious traditions. The recent inclusion of religion in setting the 
development agenda can be read as an expression of the hegemony of Northern interests 
(Clarke, 2008, pp. 18-21). Indeed, aspects of the critical reading of the World Bank’s 
faiths and development agenda above encourage such an observation. Yet we argue that 
this is not a sufficient point upon which to rest. Religious traditions are best understood 
as ambivalent (Appleby, 2000, pp. 288-301; Haynes, 2007, pp. 53-74). In practice this 
means that religious actors offer both limitations to alternative development ideas and 
practices but also the potential to articulate and gain support for such alternatives. 
Critical approaches must understand this to more fully account for counter-hegemonic 
activity taking place in the South. Further research needs to be directed towards actors 
excluded from the development agenda and their agency needs to be re-evaluated. There 
are numerous examples of this ranging from the role of religious actors in anti-dam 
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movements in Brazil (Rothman and Oliver, 2002), opposition to mining in the 
Philippines (Holden and Jacobsen, 2007), and promoting neglected aspects of 
development such as health (Farmer, 2005), water and other basic needs (Patterson, 
2007), which can explicitly or implicitly critique dominant development priorities and 
practices.  
Religion and religious actors are embedded in social and political worlds in the 
South that make them difficult to ‘see’ and measure using conventional analysis of 
formalised organisations. However, given the importance of religious agency it is 
imperative that critical theorists not exclude religion from counter-hegemonic praxis. 
Studies of religious actors in counter-hegemonic movements tend to escape this dilemma 
by name swapping. For example, religious groups become ‘community groups’, 
‘grassroots organisations’, or part of ‘social movements’ when they challenge the 
hegemony of the development agenda whereas they remain ‘religious’ when they are 
associated with dominant ideas and practices. We argue for a new categorisation of 
religious actors. Agency, whether hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, cannot clearly be 
attributed to either sacral or secular structures, ideas, or worldviews. At the local level 
the secular and sacral are mutually constitutive (Asad, 2003, pp. 21-66; Marty, 2003).  
Rather than simply adding religion to the critical secular frameworks of the past, 
new research initiatives that take religion seriously need to be resituated within a 
secular-sacral conception of the spaces of development, and founded in an ambivalent 
notion of religion. Unless this can be achieved, critical approaches to development will 
continue to exclude core elements of religion that, in turn, will undermine its ability to 
critique the development agenda and the cooption of civil society. It is a particular 
challenge for critical scholars from the North who are susceptible to ‘speak about Third 
World societies in terms…that, as it were, socially homogenised the poverty of those 
societies’ (Kitching, 2001, p. 302). By contrast, Nandy’s perspective usefully 
differentiates religion as ‘ideology’ and religion as ‘faith’. Religion as ideology takes the 
form of a ‘sub-national, national or cross-national identifier of populations contesting for 
or protecting non-religious, usually political or socioeconomic, interests’ (Nandy, 2002, 
pp. 61-62). This is contrasted by, and in conflict with, the concept of faith as ‘religion as 
a way of life, a tradition which is definitely non-monolithic and operationally plural’ 
(Nandy, 2002, p. 62). For Nandy, in differentiating the ‘two axis on 
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which…contemporary religions can be plotted’ the state ‘always prefers to deal with 
religious ideologies rather than with faiths’ (2002, pp. 63-4). We suggest the same with 
regards to IFIs and the cooption of formal religious actors into the development agenda.     
 
7 CONCLUSION  
We have introduced the issues above with the intention of provoking further critical 
inquiry into the role of religion in negotiating, setting, and contesting the development 
agenda. Critical approaches to the opening of the development space, and particularly 
the role of civil society, are helpful in identifying the asymmetries of power between 
IFIs and civil society actors and within civil society itself. The dynamics of inclusion 
and exclusion in the development space are crucial for analysing the hegemony of the 
international development agenda and the potential for counter-hegemonic agency. We 
argue that these relations are thoughtfully and effectively articulated in critical 
approaches toward civil society in development. However, we suggest that the critical 
approach has not been extended to religious actors despite their influence in 
communities in the South. By drawing on the exclusion of religious actors from above 
and from below we have argued that religious actors are subject to a limited engagement 
that overlooks their role in reproducing hegemonic relations and holding counter-
hegemonic potential in the development space to generate alternatives. Understanding 
the mutually constitutive relationship between secular and sacral elements of the social 
world will, in turn, enable critical theorists to differentiate the effects of religious civil 
society actors at the international and local levels.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Agrawal A, Sivaramakrishnan K. 2001. Introduction: Agrarian Environments. In Social 
Nature: Resources, Representations, and Rule in India, Agrawal, A, 
Sivaramakrishnan, K (eds). Oxford University Press, New Delhi: 1-22. 
Amoore L, Langley P. 1999. Ambiguities of global civil society. Review of International 
Studies 30(1): 89-110. DOI: 10.1017/S0260210504005844 
Appleby R.S. 2000. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and 
Reconciliation. Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland. 
 19 
Asad T. 2003. Formations of the Secular. Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford California.  
Beckmann D, Agarwala R, Burmester S, Serageldin I. 1991. Friday Morning Reflections 
at the World Bank: Essays on Values and Development. Seven Locks Press, 
Washington DC. 
Belo F. 1981. A Materialist Reading of the Gospel of Mark. Orbis, New York.    
Belshaw D, Calderisi R, Sugden C. 2001. Faith in Development. Partnership between 
the World Bank and the Churches of Africa. Regnum Books /The World Bank, 
Oxford/Washington. 
Benedetti C. 2006. Islamic and Christian Inspired Relief NGOs: between tactical 
collaboration and strategic diffidence? Journal of International Development 
18(6): 849-859. DOI: 10.1002/jid.1318   
Bennett, Z. 2007. ‘Action is the Life of All’: the praxis-based epistemology of liberation 
theology. In Liberation Theology, Rowland, C (ed). Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 39-54  
Berger P (ed). 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion in World 
Politics. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids. 
Berryman P. 1987. Liberation Theology: The Essential Facts About the Revolutionary 
Movement in Latin America and Beyond. Pantheon, New York. 
Bøås, M, McNeill D. 2004. Introduction: power and ideas in multilateral institutions: 
towards and interpretive framework. In Global Institutions and Development: 
Framing the World? Bøås M, McNeill, D (eds). Routledge, London/New York: 
1-12. 
Boff C, Pixley J. 1989. The Bible, The Church and the Poor. Burns & Oats, London. 
Boff L, Boff J. 1987. Introduction to Liberation Theology. Burns & Oats, London. 
Bonino J. 1975. Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation. Fortress Press, 
Philadelphia. 
Brown R. 1984. Unexpected News. Reading the Bible With Third World Eyes. 
Westminster, Philadelphia.  
Brunnstrom C. 2003. Another Invasion: lessons from international support to East 
Timorese NGOs. Development in Practice 13(4): 310-321. DOI: 
10.1080/0961452032000156600 
 20 
Busby J. 2007. Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, debt relief, and moral action 
in international politics. International Studies Quarterly 51(2): 247-275. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00451.x 
Carbone M, Lister M. 2006. New Pathways in International Development: Gender and 
Civil Society in EU Policy. Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Casanova J. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Chandhoke N. 2003. The Conceits of Civil Society. Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
Clarke G. 2006. Faith Matters: faith-based organisations, civil society and international 
development. Journal of International Development 18(6): 835-848. DOI: 
10.1002/jid.1317  
Clarke G. 2007. Agents of Transformation? Donors, faith-based organisations and 
international development. Third World Quarterly 28(1):77-96. DOI: 
10.1080/01436590601081880 
Clarke G. 2008. Faith-based organizations and international development: an overview. 
In Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the 
Sacred and the Secular, Clarke G, Jennings M (eds). Palgrave MacMillan, New 
York: 17-45 
Clarke G, Jennings M. 2008 (eds). Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based 
Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular. Palgrave MacMillan, New 
York. 
Cohen J, Arato A. 1992. Civil Society and Political Theory. The MIT Press: Cambridge 
MA.  
Cornwall A, Brock K. 2006. The New Buzzwords. In Reclaiming Development 
Agendas: Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Making, P. Utting (ed). 
Palgrave Macmillan/ UNRSID, Basingstoke: 43-70. 
Cox R. 1981/1996. Social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations 
theory. In Approaches to World Order, Cox R, Sinclair, T (eds). Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 85-123. 
Darlington S. 1998. The Ordination of a Tree: The Buddhist Ecology Movement in 
Thailand. Ethnology 37(1): 1-15. 
 21 
Dasgupta A, Beard, V. 2007. Community Driven Development, Collective Action and 
Elite Capture in Indonesia. Development and Change 38(2): 229-249. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00410.x 
Eade D (ed). 2002. Development and Culture: A Development in Practice Reader. 
Oxfam GB / WFDD, London. 
Edwards M. 1999. Legitimacy and values in NGOs and voluntary associations: some 
sceptical thoughts. In International Perspectives on Voluntary Action: Reshaping 
the Third Sector, Lewis, D (ed). Earthscan, London: 258-67. 
Esposito J, Watson M (eds). 2000. Religion and the Global Order. University of Wales 
Press, Cardiff. 
Farmer P. 2005. Pathologies of Power: health, human rights, and the new war on the 
poor. University of California Press, Berkeley.  
Feldman S. 2003. Paradoxes of Institutionalisation: the depoliticisation of Bangladeshi NGOs. 
Development in Practice, 13(1): 5-26. DOI: 10.1080/0961452022000037955 
Fox J, Sandler S. 2006. Bringing Religion into International Relations. Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York. 
Galvan D. 2004. The State Must Be Our Master of Fire: How peasants craft culturally 
sustainable development in Senegal. University of California Press, Berkeley.  
Gill A. 2002. The study of liberation theology: what next? Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 41(1): 87-89 
Girvan N. 2006. The Search for Policy Autonomy in the Global South. In Reclaiming 
Development Agendas: Knowledge, Power and International Policy Making. 
Utting P (ed). Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke: 73-89. 
Goonatilake S. 2006. Recolonisation: Foreign Funded NGOs in Sri Lanka. Sage 
Publications, New Delhi.  
Grugel J. 2000. Romancing Civil Society: European NGOs in Latin America. Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42(2): 87-101. 
Gutierrez G. 1973. A Theology of Liberation. SCM, London. 
Guttal S. 2006. Challenging the Knowledge Business. In Reclaiming Development 
Agendas: Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Making. Utting, P (ed). 
Palgrave Macmillan/ UNRSID, Basingstoke: 25-42. 
Harcourt W. 2003. Editorial: Clearing the path of collective compassion. Development 
 22 
46(4): 3-5. DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.development.1110483 
Harrison T. 2007 The Role of Contestation in NGO Partnerships. Journal of 
International Development 19(3): 389–400. DOI: 10.1002/jid.1373   
Harriss J. 2001/2004. Depoliticizing Development: The World Bank and Social Capital. 
Leftword, New Delhi.  
Haynes J. 1994. Religion in Third World Politics. Lynne Rienner, Boulder.  
Haynes J. 2007. Religion and Development: Conflict or Cooperation? Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York. 
Henry L, Mohan G, Yanacopulos H. 2004. Networks as transnational agents of 
development. Third World Quarterly 25(5): 839-55. DOI: 
10.1080/0143659042000231983 
Holden W, Jacobsen R. 2007. Ecclesial opposition to mining in Mindanao: 
Neoliberalism encounters the church of the poor in the land of promise. 
Worldviews: Environment, Culture, Religion 11(2): 155-202. DOI: 
10.1163/156853507X204923 
Hoornaert G. 1989. The Memory of the Christian People. Burns & Oats, London.  
Huddock A. 1999. NGOs and Civil Society: Democracy by Proxy? Polity, Cambridge. 
Hudson, A. 2001. NGOs’ transnational advocacy networks: from “legitimacy” to 
“political responsibility”? Global Networks 1(4): 331–352. DOI: 10.1111/1471-
0374.00019 
Hurd, E.S. 2008. The Politics of Secularism in International Relations. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
Kaldor M. 2003. Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Polity, Cambridge. 
Kapur D, Lewis J, Webb R. 1997. The World Bank: Its First Half Century Vol 1. 
Brookings Institution Press. Washington, DC.  
Kitching G. 2001. Seeking Social Justice Through Globalization: Escaping a Nationalist 
Perspective. Penn State Press, Pennsylvania. 
Lewis D. 2001. The Management of Non-Governmental development organisations: an 
introduction. Routledge, London/New York. 
Linklater A. 1992. The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations: A Critical 
Theoretical Point of View. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21(1): 
77-98.  
 23 
Marshall K, Marsh R (eds). 2003. Millennium Challenges for Faith Development and 
Faith Institutions. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Marshall K, Keough L. 2004. Mind, Heart & Soul in the Fight Against Poverty. The 
World Bank, Washington DC. 
Marshall K, Keough L. 2005. Finding Global Balance: Common Ground Between the 
Worlds of Development and Faith. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Marshall K, Van Saanen M. 2007. Development and Faith: Where Mind, Heart, and 
Soul Work Together, The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Marty M. 2003. Our Religio-secular World. Daedalus 132(3)42-48. 
Matthews S. 2004. Post-development theory and the question of alternatives: a view 
from Africa. Third World Quarterly 25(2): 373-384. DOI: 
10.1080/0143659042000174860 
McNeill D. 2004. Social Capital and the World Bank. In Global Institutions and 
Development: Framing the World? Bøås M, McNeill D (eds). Routledge, 
London/New York: 108-123. 
Michael S. 2004. Undermining Development: The Absence of Power among Local 
NGOs in Africa. Indiana University Press: Bloomington. 
Miguez N. 2006. Latin American reading of the Bible: experiences, challenges and its 
practice. The Expository Times 118(3):120-129.  
Miranda J. 1974. Marx and the Bible. Orbis Books, New York. 
Mitchell M. 2002. ‘Living Our Faith:’ The Lenten Pastoral Letter of the Bishops of 
Malawi and the shift to multiparty democracy, 1992-1993. Journal for the Social 
Scientific Study of Religion 41(1): 5-18. 
Mohan G. 2002. The Disappointments of Civil Society: the Politics of NGO Intervention 
in northern Ghana. Political Geography 21(1): 125-154. DOI: 10.1016/S0962-
6298(01)00072-5 
Murphy J. 2005. The World Bank, INGOs, and Civil Society: Converging Agendas? The 
Case of Universal Basic Education in Niger. Voluntas: International Journal of 
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 16(4): 353-374. DOI: 10.1007/s11266-
005-9147-x 
Nandy A. 2002. Time Warps: The Insistent Politics of Silent and Evasive Pasts. Hurst & 
Company, London. 
 24 
Narayan D. 2001. Voices of the poor. In Faith in Development: Partnership between the 
World Bank and the churches of Africa, Belshaw D, Calderisi R, Sugden C (eds). 
Regnum Books / World Bank, Oxford/Washington: 39-48 
Norris P, Inglehart R. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. 
Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Obadare E. 2005. Second Thoughts on Civil Society: The State, Civic Associations and 
the Antinomies of the Public Sphere in Nigeria. Journal of Civil Society 1(3): 
267-281. DOI: 10.1080/17448680500484426 
Ocampo J. 2002. Rethinking the Development Agenda. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 26(3): 393-407. DOI: 10.1093/cje/26.3.393. 
Öniş Z, Şenses F. 2005. Rethinking the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus. 
Development and Change 36(2): 263–290. DOI: 10.1111/j.0012-
155X.2005.00411.x 
Pallas C. 2005. Canterbury to Cameroon: a new partnership between faiths and the 
World Bank. Development in Practice 15(5): 677-684. DOI: 
10.1080/09614520500129248 
Palmer M, Finlay V. 2003. Faith in Conservation: New Approaches to Religions and the 
Environment. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Patterson A. 2007. Civil Society Organisations: The search for empowerment. In 
Towards Africa’s Renewal, Senghor J and Poku N (eds). Ashgate, Aldershot: 
255-278.  
Peccoud D (ed). 2004. Philosophical and Spiritual Perspectives on Decent Work. 
International Labour Office, Geneva. 
Poethig K. 2002. Moveable peace: engaging the transnational in Cambodia’s 
Dhammayietra. Journal for the Social Scientific Study of Religion 41(1):19-28 
Rothman F, Oliver T. 2002. From Local to Global: the anti-dam movement in Southern 
Brazil, 1979-1992. In Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions 
of Social Movements, Smith J, Johnston, H (eds). Rowman and Littlefield, 
Lanham Maryland: 115-132.   
Scholte J. 2002. Civil society and democracy in global governance. Global Governance 
8(3): 281-305.  
Suh D. 1991. The Korean Minjung in Christ. The Christian Conference of Asia, Hong 
 25 
Kong. 
Taylor I. 2004. Hegemony, neoliberal ‘good governance’ and the International Monetary 
Fund: a Gramscian Perspective. In Global Institutions and Development: 
Framing the World? Bøås M, McNeill D (eds). Routledge, London/New York: 
124-135. 
Taylor M, Tyndale W, Shanker V, Clay M. 2003. WFDD – The Future. Discussion 
Paper; 24 September 2003. Available at 
<http://www.wfdd.org.uk/programmes/futurediscdec_03.pdf >  Accessed 27th 
May 2005.  
Thomas S. 2000. Taking religious and cultural pluralism seriously: the global resurgence 
of religion and the transformation of international society. Millennium 29 (3): 
815-841. 
Thomas S. 2004. Building Communities of Character: foreign aid policy and faith-based 
institutions. SAIS Review XXIV(2): 133-148. 
Thomas S. 2005. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of 
International Relations. Palgrave MacMillan, New York.  
Townsend J, Porter G, Mawdsley E. 2002. The role of the transnational community of 
non-government organisations: governance or poverty reduction? Journal of 
International Development 14(6): 829-839. DOI: 10.1002/jid.928 
Tyndale W. 2002. Faith and economics in ‘development’: a bridge across the chasm? In 
Development and Culture: A Development in Practice Reader, Eade D (ed). 
Oxfam GB / WFDD London: 45-59. 
Tyndale W. 2003. Idealism and practicality: The role of religion and development. 
Development 46(4): 22-28. DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.development.1110486 
Tyndale W (ed). 2006. Visions of Development: Faith-based Initiatives. Ashgate, 
Hampshire, UK.  
Ulvila M, Hossain F. 2002. Development NGOs and Political Participation of the Poor 
in Bangladesh and Nepal. Voluntas - International Journal of Voluntary and 
Nonprofit Organizations 13(2): 149-163.  
Utting P. 2006. Introduction: Reclaiming Development Agendas. In Reclaiming 
Development Agendas: Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Making, 
Utting, P (ed). Palgrave Macmillan/ UNRSID, Basingstoke: 1-24. 
 26 
Valley P. 1990. Bad Samaritans: First World Ethics and Third World Debt. Hodder and 
Stoughton, Kent. 
Vasavakul T. 2003. From Fence-Breaking to Networking: Interests, Popular 
Organizations, and Policy Influences in Post-Socialist Vietnam. In Getting 
Organised in Vietnam: Moving in and around the Socialist State. Kerkvliet B, 
Heng R, Koh, D (eds). ISEAS, Singapore: 25-61. 
Westerlund D (ed). 1996. Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of 
Religion and Politics. I.B. Taurus, London. 
White, S. 1996. Depoliticising Development: the uses and abuses of participation. 
Development in Practice 6(1): 6 - 15. 
Wolfensohn. 2004. Millennium Challenges for Faith and Development. Available at 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/PARTNERS
/EXTDEVDIALOGUE/0,,contentMDK:20357345~menuPK:64192472~pagePK:
64192523~piPK:64192458~theSitePK:537298,00.html> Accessed 25th May, 
2006. 
World Bank. 2006. Faiths and Ethics Agenda in the World Bank: history, progress and 
options. Marshall K. and HDNDE working paper, March 15, World Bank, 
Washington DC.   
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Classifying religious actors linked to the World Bank within a critical 
development typology of civil society actors 
 
Formal organisations in the 
North: Setting the 
Development Agenda 
Formal organisations in the 
South: Access to the 
Development Agenda 
Informal actors in the 
South: Limited Access to 
the Development Agenda 
 
¤ World Vision 
¤# World Faiths Development 
Dialogue (WFDD) 
# World Council of Churches 
# Spirit of Fes Foundation 
# Women, Faith and 
Development Alliance 
(WFDA) 
 
* Delegates of World 
 
# Community of Sant’Egidio 
 
* Council of Anglican 
Provinces of Africa 
 
* Sarvodaya Movement 
 
* Vikram Sarabhai 
Foundation 
 
 
^ Guatemalan Inter-
religious Dialogue on 
Development (DIRGD) 
 
^ Ethiopian Interfaith 
Forum for Development 
Dialogue and Action 
(EIFDDA) 
 
^ Interfaith health sector 
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Religions  
 
+ Alliance for Religions and 
Conservation 
+ Religions for Peace  
+ World Parliament of 
Religions 
+ United Religions Initiative, 
+ 3iG Int’l Interfaith 
Investment Group  
+ Pontifical Counsel on Justice 
and Peace 
 
* Aga Khan Foundation  
 
+ AVENA  
 
 
dialogue (Tanzania) 
Key 
¤ Civil Society program partners 
# Partnerships established via the Development Dialogue on Ethics and Values 
* Dialogue and research partners in development 
+ Partnerships proposed by the World Bank working paper (2006)  
^ Community development dialogues facilitated for the World Bank by the WFDD 
Sources 
World Bank Civil Society Program; World Bank Development Dialogue on Ethics and Values; 
Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007; World Bank, 2006; Marshall and Keough, 2004; Palmer and Finlay, 
2003; Belshaw et al., 2001. 
 
